Belief updating: Does the 'good-news, bad-news' asymmetry extend to purely financial domains? by Barron, Kai
www.ssoar.info
Belief updating: Does the 'good-news, bad-news'
asymmetry extend to purely financial domains?
Barron, Kai
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Arbeitspapier / working paper
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Barron, K. (2020). Belief updating: Does the 'good-news, bad-news' asymmetry extend to purely financial domains?
(Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und
Entscheidung, Abteilung Ökonomik des Wandels, SP II 2016-309r2). Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für
Sozialforschung gGmbH. http://hdl.handle.net/10419/214884
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
econstor
Make Your Publications Visible.
A Service of
zbw Leibniz-InformationszentrumWirtschaftLeibniz Information Centrefor Economics
Barron, Kai
Working Paper
Belief updating: Does the 'good-news, bad-news'
asymmetry extend to purely financial domains?
WZB Discussion Paper, No. SP II 2016-309r2
Provided in Cooperation with:
WZB Berlin Social Science Center
Suggested Citation: Barron, Kai (2020) : Belief updating: Does the 'good-news, bad-news'
asymmetry extend to purely financial domains?, WZB Discussion Paper, No. SP II 2016-309r2,
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB), Berlin
This Version is available at:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/214884
Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:
Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen
Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.
Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle
Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich
machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.
Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen
(insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten,
gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort
genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte.
Terms of use:
Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your
personal and scholarly purposes.
You are not to copy documents for public or commercial
purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them
publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise
use the documents in public.
If the documents have been made available under an Open
Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you
may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated
licence.
www.econstor.eu
  
 
Research Area 
Markets and Choice 
Research Unit 
Economics of Change 
 
 
  
 
 
 
   
    
Kai Barron 
 
Belief updating: Does the ‘good-news, 
bad-news’ asymmetry extend to 
purely financial domains? 
 
Discussion Paper 
SP II 2016–309r2 
October 2016 (2nd revision March 2020) 
 
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH 
Reichpietschufer 50 
10785 Berlin 
Germany 
www.wzb.eu 
  
 
 
Affiliation of the authors: 
 
Kai Barron, WZB (kai.barron@wzb.eu) 
Discussion papers of the WZB serve to disseminate the research results of work 
in progress prior to publication to encourage the exchange of ideas and aca-
demic debate. Inclusion of a paper in the discussion paper series does not con-
stitute publication and should not limit publication in any other venue. The 
discussion papers published by the WZB represent the views of the respective 
author(s) and not of the institute as a whole. 
Copyright remains with the authors. 
  
Abstract 
Belief updating: Does the ‘good-news, bad-news’ asymmetry extend to 
purely financial domains?* 
 
Bayes’ statistical rule remains the status quo for modeling belief updating in both 
normative and descriptive models of behavior under uncertainty. Some recent 
research has questioned the use of Bayes’ rule in descriptive models of behavior, 
presenting evidence that people overweight ‘good news’ relative to ‘bad news’ 
when updating ego-relevant beliefs. In this paper, we present experimental evi-
dence testing whether this ‘good-news, bad-news’ effect is present in a financial 
decision making context (i.e. a domain that is important for understanding much 
economic decision making). We find no evidence of asymmetric updating in this 
domain. In contrast, in our experiment, belief updating is close to the Bayesian 
benchmark on average. However, we show that this average behavior masks sub-
stantial heterogeneity in individual updating behavior. We find no evidence in 
support of a sizeable subgroup of asymmetric updators. 
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1 Introduction
Throughout our lives, we are constantly receiving new information about ourselves and our en-
vironment. The way that we filter, summarize and store this new information is of critical im-
portance for the quality of our decision making. Theories of human behavior under dynamic
uncertainty are therefore enriched by an understanding of how individuals process new infor-
mation. Economists typically write down models where information is summarized in the form
of probabilistic ‘beliefs’ over states of the world, and updated upon receipt of new information
according to Bayes’ rule. However, the assumption that individuals process information in a sta-
tistically accurate way has increasingly been called into question, with many studies documenting
systematic deviations.1 One important strand of this literature examines whether belief formation
and updating is influenced by the affective content of the new information, i.e. whether individuals
update their beliefs symmetrically in response to ‘good-news’ and ‘bad-news’ (see, for example,
Eil and Rao (2011); Ertac (2011); Möbius et al. (2014); Coutts (2019)).
This literature tests an implicit assumption of Bayesian updating, namely that the only object that
is relevant for predicting an individual’s belief is her information set—her beliefs are completely
unaffected by the prizes and punishments she would receive in different states of the world. This
fundamental assumption—that people update their beliefs symmetrically—is important because
it underpins the entire orthodox approach to modelling uncertainty.
In this paper, we test whether individuals update their beliefs symmetrically in response to ‘good-
news’ and ‘bad-news’ when states differ only in the financial rewards they offer. To do this, we
conduct a laboratory experiment in which subjects complete a series of belief updating tasks. In
each task, there are two possible states of the world. Subjects are told the prior probabilities of
each state, and then receive a sequence of partially informative binary signals. We elicit subjects’
beliefs after each signal. The financial rewards associated with the two states are either identical
(symmetric), or different (asymmetric). This experimental design allows us to compare posterior
beliefs in situations where the entire information set is held constant, but the rewards associated
with the states of the world are varied. For example, we can compare how two groups of indi-
viduals revise their beliefs when both groups share the same prior belief and receive an equally
informative signal, but for one group of individuals the signal is ‘good news’ and for the other
the signal constitutes ‘bad news’. We can also conduct a similar exercise for a single individual,
comparing contexts where she has identical priors and signals, but the signal constitutes ‘good
news’ in one context, and ‘bad news’ in the other. These comparisons provide a clean test of the
1Some notable examples include the representativeness bias (Grether, 1978, 1980, 1992), cognitive dissonance
(Akerlof and Dickens, 1982), anticipatory utility (Loewenstein, 1987; Caplin and Leahy, 2001; Brunnermeier and
Parker, 2005), base rate neglect (Kahneman and Tversky, 1973; Holt and Smith, 2009), confirmatory bias (Rabin and
Schrag, 1999), motivated belief formation (Benabou and Tirole, 2002), correlation neglect (Enke and Zimmermann,
2019), and selection neglect (Esponda and Vespa, 2018; Barron et al., 2019; Enke, 2019).
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asymmetric updating hypothesis.
The experiment considers belief updating in two contexts. In the symmetric treatment, subjects
have an equal stake in each of the underlying states. In the two asymmetric treatments, a larger
bonus payment is paid in one of the two states of the world. This design permits two separate
tests of the asymmetric updating hypothesis. First, we can compare how the same individual
responds to ‘good-news’ and ‘bad-news’ within the asymmetric treatments. Second, we can
conduct a between-subject comparison of belief updating in the symmetric treatment and asym-
metric treatments. Each individual in our experiment faces only one incentive environment.
However, since we exogenously endow participants with a prior over the states of the world, we
are able to repeat the exercise several times for each individual and study how they update from
each of five different priors, p0, chosen from the set {16 , 26 , 36 , 46 , 56}.
The experimental design and analysis aim to address several challenges that are present when
studying belief updating in the presence of state dependent stakes. First, we use exogenous
variation in the priors to ensure that the estimates are robust to the econometric issues that arise
when a right-hand side variable (i.e. the prior) is a lagged version of the dependent variable
(i.e. the posterior). Second, we avoid a second type of endogeneity issue, which arises when the
underlying states are defined as a function of some personal characteristic of the individual (e.g.
her relative IQ) that might also be related to how she updates (see Appendix C for further details).
Third, we measure the influence that hedging has on belief elicitation when there are state-
dependent stakes. Furthermore, we conduct several exercises to correct our estimates for this
hedging influence - both experimentally, and econometrically. Fourth, our experimental design
allows us to study belief updating from priors spanning much of the unit interval. Importantly,
averaging across all subjects, the design generates a balanced distribution of ‘good’ and ‘bad’
signals.
Our results show no evidence in favor of asymmetric updating in response to ‘good-news’ in
comparison to ‘bad-news’ in the domain of financial outcomes. Several robustness exercises are
carried out in support of this conclusion. Furthermore, we find that average updating behavior
is well approximated by Bayes’ rule.2 This average behavior masks substantial heterogeneity
in updating behavior at the individual level, but we find no evidence in support of a sizeable
subgroup of asymmetric updators.
The evidence reported here contributes to the recent literature studying the asymmetric updating
hypothesis across different contexts (e.g. Eil and Rao (2011), Ertac (2011), Grossman and Owens
(2012), Mayraz (2013), Möbius et al. (2014), Kuhnen (2015), Schwardmann and Van der Weele
(2019), Gotthard-Real (2017) Charness and Dave (2017), Heger and Papageorge (2018), Buser
et al. (2018) and Coutts (2019)). The results in this literature thus far are highly heterogeneous,
2This is in line with, e.g. Holt and Smith (2009) and Coutts (2019), who find that average posteriors across all
individuals are well approximated by posteriors obtained by applying Bayes’ rule.
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with some papers finding a greater responsiveness to good-news, some a greater responsiveness
to bad-news, and some no evidence of an asymmetry. The objective of the experiment discussed
in this paper is not to isolate the contextual features that activate and deactivate asymmetric
updating; rather the objective is to provide a clean test of the asymmetric updating hypothesis
for contexts in which states differ only in their material rewards and have no direct ego-relevance.
The reason for focusing on this context (where states yield different financial outcomes) is that
it characterizes a large class of economically important decision problems under uncertainty—
most economic models with uncertainty fit this description. This paper does not disentangle the
reasons for why updating is asymmetric in some settings but not in others. Instead, by providing
a clean test of the asymmetric updating hypothesis for one specific domain, the paper contributes
to the growing collective body of evidence pertaining to asymmetric updating across a range
of contexts. There are several candidate contextual and experimental design factors that could
be generating the heterogeneous results observed in the literature as a whole. Section 7 below
offers a discussion of some of these candidate explanations, and asks whether the existing body
of evidence can help us to detect a systematic pattern that organizes the results.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the theoretical framework,
Section 3 details the experimental design, Section 4 provides some descriptive statistics, Section
5 presents the empirical specification, Section 6 discusses the related literature and Section 7
concludes.
2 Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses
The following section discusses a simple framework for belief updating that augments the stan-
dard normative Bayesian benchmark to allow for several commonly hypothesized deviations from
Bayes’ rule. This framework is borrowed from Möbius et al. (2014) and is commonly used for
analyzing belief updating descriptively. The framework provides a basis for the empirical ap-
proach that we will use to test whether agents update their beliefs asymmetrically in response to
‘good-news’ and ‘bad-news’.
2.1 A Simple Model of Belief Formation
We consider a single agent who forms a belief over two states of the world, ω ∈ {A,B}, at each
point in time, t. One of these states of the world is selected by nature as the ‘correct’ (or ‘realized’)
state, where state ω = A is chosen with prior probability p¯0 (known to the agent). The agent’s
belief at time t is denoted by pit ∈ [0, 1], where pit is the agent’s belief regarding the likelihood
that the state is ω = A and 1 − pit is the agent’s belief that the state is ω = B. In each period,
4
the agent receives a signal, st ∈ {a, b}, regarding the state of the world, which is correct with
probability q ∈ (12 , 1). In other words, p(a|A) = p(b|B) = q > 12 . The history, Ht, is defined as the
sequence of signals received by the agent in periods 1, . . . , t, with H0 = ∅. Therefore, the history
at time t is given by Ht = (s1, ..., st).
To study how individuals update their beliefs, we follow Möbius et al. (2014) in considering the
following model of augmented Bayesian updating:
logit(pit+1) = δlogit(pit) + γa log(
q
1− q ) · 1(st+1 = a)− γb log(
q
1− q ) · 1(st+1 = b) (1)
The parameters δ, γa and γb can be interpretted as follows. If δ = γa = γb = 1 then the agent
updates her beliefs according to Bayes’ rule. The δ parameter captures the degree to which the
agent’s prior affects her updating. For example, if δ > 1 then the agent displays a confirmatory
bias3, whereby she is more responsive to information that supports her prior. In contrast, if δ < 1
she is more responsive to information that contradicts her prior (i.e. base rate neglect4). The
former would predict that beliefs will polarize over time, while the latter would predict that over
time beliefs remain too close to 0.5.
The parameters, γa and γb capture the agent’s responsiveness to information. If γa = γb < 1 then
the agent is less responsive to information than a Bayesian. And if γa = γb > 1, then she is more
responsive than a Bayesian. For example, if γa = 2, then whenever the agent receives a signal
st = a, she updates her belief exactly as much as a Bayesian would if he received two a signals,
st = {a, a}. The interpretation of the parameters is summarized in the first five rows of Table 1
below.
Table 1: Interpretation of Parameters: A Summary
Belief Updating Distortion Parameter Values
Bayesian Updating δ = 1, γa = 1 and γb = 1
Confirmatory Bias δ > 1
Base Rate Neglect δ < 1
Conservatism γj < 1 for ∀j ∈ {a, b}
Overresponsiveness γj > 1 for ∀j ∈ {a, b}
Optimistic updating (in ASYMMETRIC) γa > γb
Pessimistic updating (in ASYMMETRIC) γa < γb
3For a detailed discussion of the confirmatory bias, see Rabin and Schrag (1999). Essentially, it is the tendency
to weight information that supports one’s priors more heavily than information that opposes one’s priors. In this
case, when one’s prior regarding state ω = A is greater than 0.5, i.e. pit > 0.5, a participant who is prone to the
confirmatory bias weights signals that support state ω = A more heavily than signals that support state ω = B; and
vice versa when her prior suggests state ω = B is more likely, i.e. pit < 0.5.
4One can think of base rate neglect in this context as the agent forming her beliefs as if she attenuates the influence
of her prior belief when calculating her posterior—i.e. acting as if her prior was closer to 0.5 than it actually was.
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Affective States
In the preceding section, the affect or desirability of different states of the world played no role.
However, in most situations in which individuals form beliefs, there are some states that yield an
outcome that is preferred to the outcomes associated with other states - i.e. there are good and
bad states of the world
To allow for the possibility that individuals update their beliefs differently in response to good-
news in comparison to bad-news, we relax the assumption that belief updating is orthogonal to the
affect of the information.5 To do this, assume that each of the two states of the world is associated
with a certain outcome—i.e. in state ω = A, the agent receives outcome xA, and in state ω = B,
she receives xB. There are now two belief updating scenarios:
• Scenario 1 (symmetric): the agent is indifferent between outcomes (i.e. xA ∼ xB ); and
• Scenario 2 (asymmetric): the agent strictly prefers one of the two outcomes (i.e. xA  xB).
The question of interest is whether the agent will update her beliefs differently in the symmetric
and asymmetric scenarios. Under the assumption that the agent’s behavior is consistent with
the model described above in Equation 1, this involves asking whether the parameters δ,γa and
γb, differ between the two contexts.
To guide our discussion, we consider the following two benchmarks. The first natural bench-
mark is Bayes’ rule, which prescribes that all three parameters equal 1 in both the symmetric
and asymmetric contexts—statistically efficient updating of probabilities is unaffected by state-
dependent rewards and punishments. According to Bayes’ rule, news is news, independent of its
affective content.
Hypothesis 1 (Bayesian Updating) Individuals update their beliefs according to Bayes’ rule. There-
fore, δ = 1,γa = 1 and γb = 1 in both symmetric and asymmetric scenarios.
The second benchmark that we consider is provided by the asymmetric updating hypothesis—that
individuals respond more to ‘good-news’ than ‘bad-news’. Here, in our simple framework there
are two ways to identify asymmetric updating.
First, if we only consider the behavior of individuals within the asymmetric scenario, we can
ask whether there is an asymmetry in updating after signals that favor the more desirable state
ω = A (‘good-news’), relative to signals that favor the less desirable state ω = B (‘bad-news’). For
5To avoid ambiguity, in the discussion below, the term ‘preference’ is usually used to refer to preferences over sure
outcomes—never to a preference ordering over lotteries. We will also sometimes refer to ‘preferring’ one state of the
world to another. This simply captures the idea that an individual prefers the realisation of a state in which a good
outcome is realised.
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example, if γa > γb, this would indicate that the agent updates more in response to ‘good-news’.
We refer to such an agent as an optimistic updater. Conversely, if we have γa < γb then the agent
updates more in response to ‘bad-news’. We refer to such an agent as a pessimistic updater.
Second, if we compare behavior between the symmetric and asymmetric scenarios, we can
ask whether the parameters of equation 1 differ according to the scenario. We use the postscript
c ∈ {A, S} to distinguish the parameters in the two scenarios—i.e. δS,γSa and γSb in symmetric
and δA,γAa and γAb in asymmetric. In the symmetric treatment, where the agent is completely
indifferent between the two states, there is no reason to expect her updating to be asymmetric.
Therefore, we assume that γSa = γSb = γS. Thus, the difference γAa − γSa reflects a measure
of the increase in the agent’s responsiveness when information is desirable, relative to when
information is neutral in terms of its affect. Similarly, γAb − γSb is a measure of the increase in the
agent’s responsiveness when information is undesirable, relative to the case in which information
is neutral in affect.
Hypothesis 2 (Asymmetric Updating) Individuals update their beliefs asymmetrically, responding
more to good than bad news. Therefore, within the asymmetric scenario, we will observe γAa > γAb .
And in a comparison between the symmetric and asymmetric scenarios, we will observe γAa − γSa > 0
and γAb − γSb < 0. Together, we can summarize the asymmetric updating hypothesis parameter
predictions as follows: γAa > γS > γAb .
2.2 Belief Elicitation and Incentives
To empirically test the hypotheses above using an experiment, we would like to be able to elicit
our participants’ true beliefs. However, eliciting beliefs when studying the relationship between
preferences and beliefs presents additional challenges. In particular, one needs to account for
the inherent hedging motive faced by participants who have a stake in one state of the world
(see Karni and Safra (1995) for a discussion). To obtain unbiased reported beliefs, we adopt the
approach developed by Offerman et al. (2009), and extended to accommodate state-dependent
stakes as in Kothiyal et al. (2011).
The central idea behind this approach is to acknowledge that the incentive environment within
which we elicit beliefs in the laboratory may exert a distortionary influence on reported beliefs.
We therefore measure this distortionary influence of the incentive environment in a separate part
of the experiment. Once we have constructed a mapping from true beliefs to reported beliefs
within the relevant incentive environment, we can invert this function to recover the participant’s
true beliefs from her reported beliefs. Our objective, therefore, is to recover the function that each
individual uses to map her true beliefs to the beliefs that she reports within the given incentive
environment.
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The incentive environment that we use in our experiment to elicit beliefs is the quadratic scoring
rule (QSR).6 Appendix B.2 provides a detailed discussion of way in which reported beliefs might
be distorted under the quadratic scoring rule. In the absence of state-dependent stakes, it is well
documented under the QSR a risk averse agent should distort their reported belief towards 50%.
With state-dependant stakes, a risk averse EU maximizer will face two distortionary motives in
reporting her belief: (i) she will face the motive to distort her belief towards 50% as discussed
above; and (ii) in addition, there is a hedging motive, which will compel a risk averse individual to
lower her reported belief, rt, towards 0% as the size of the exogenous stake increases increases.7
If the participants in our experiment are risk neutral expected utility maximizers, the reported
beliefs, rt, that we elicit under the QSR will coincide with their true beliefs, pit, and no belief
correction is necessary. However, to account for a hedging motive (e.g. due to risk aversion),
we measure the size of the distortionary influence of the elicitation incentives at an individual
level and correct the beliefs accordingly. The following section provides the intuition for how this
correction works.
A Non-EU ‘Truth Serum’
The Offerman et al. (2009) approach proposes correcting reported beliefs for the reporting bias
generated by risk aversion or non-linear probability weighting. This approach involves eliciting
subjects’ reported beliefs, r, corresponding to a set of risky events where both the participant and
the analyst know the objective probabilities, p (known probability). This is done under precisely
the same QSR incentive environment in which the subjects’ subjective beliefs, pi, regarding the
events of interest are elicited (unknown probability). If a subject’s reported beliefs, r, differ from
the known objective probabilities, p, this indicates that the subject is distorting her beliefs due to
the incentive environment (e.g. due to risk aversion). The objective of the correction mechanism
is therefore to construct a map, R, from the objective probabilities, p ∈ [0, 1], to the reported
beliefs, r, for each individual under the relevant incentive environment. Given this map, R, we
6There are several reasons for adopting this approach: firstly, the QSR has the advantage that it ensures that the
decision environment is clear and simple for the participants—essentially they are making a single choice from a
list of binary prospects; secondly, the QSR has been widely used in the literature, implying that both the theoretical
properties and empirical performance are well understood (see, e.g., Armantier and Treich (2013)); thirdly, in a horse
race between elicitation methods, Trautmann and van de Kuilen (2015) show that there is no improvement in the
empirical performance of more complex elicitation methods over the Offerman et al. (2009) method, neither in terms
of internal validity, nor in terms of behavior prediction. Out of the set of alternative elicitation techniques, the two
that are most theoretically attractive are the binarized scoring rule, proposed by Hossain and Okui (2013), and the
probability matching mechanism, described by Grether (1992) and Karni (2009). However, in the context of the
current paper, we viewed neither of these approaches as being preferable to the Offerman et al. (2009) technique,
since both of these approaches introduce an additional layer of probabilities and in the study of probability bias, this
is an undesirable attribute of the elicitation strategy.
7This assumes that the state-dependent payment is associated with the 100% state, not the 0% state. This as-
sumption is made throughout the paper and the experiment.
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can invert the function and recover the subject’s true beliefs from her reported beliefs about events
with unknown probabilities, pi.
In Appendix B.2, we offer a detailed discussion of how the Offerman et al. (2009) method op-
erates, describes the underlying assumptions, and demonstrate how it can be augmented (as
proposed in Kothiyal et al. (2011)) to allow for the scenario where there are state-contingent
stakes (i.e. x 6= 0).
3 Experimental Design
The experiment is designed to test the asymmetric updating hypothesis using both within-subject
and between-subjects comparisons of updating behavior. The experiment consists of three treat-
ment groups. The treatment T1.Symmetric corresponds to Scenario 1 (symmetric: no exoge-
nous state-contingent stakes) and the other two treatment groups, T2.Combined and T3.Separate,
correspond to Scenario 2 (asymmetric: state-contingent stakes) discussed above.
The two asymmetric treatments, T2.Combined and T3.Separate, have identical financial incen-
tives. The rationale for running two treatments with identical incentives was to conduct additional
checks to ensure that our results were not driven by the influence of a hedging motive. To do
this, we vary only the way that the incentive environment is described to participants (i.e. we
only vary the framing of the incentives).
The experiment proceeds in three stages. The first stage comprises the core belief updating task
in which we elicit a sequence of reported beliefs from subjects as they received a sequence of noisy
signals. In the second stage we collect the reported probabilities associated with known objective
probabilities on the interval [0, 1] required for the Offerman et al. (2009) correction approach,
as well as data on risk preferences. In the third stage, we obtain data on several demographic
characteristics as well as some further non-incentivized measures. In each of the first two stages,
one of the subject’s choices is chosen at random and paid out. In addition the participants receive
a fixed fee of £5 [e5] for completing Stage 3, as well as a show-up fee of £5 [e5].8
The Belief Updating Task (Stage 1)
The Belief Updating Task is the primary task of the experiment, and is summarized in Figure 1.
8In the discussion below, I will always refer only to Pounds (£), however half of the sessions were run at the
Technical University in Berlin where all the payments were made in Euros. In all cases, the payment in Pounds (£)
was equivalent to the payment in Euros (e).
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Figure 1: Overview of Experimental Design
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Belief Report 0 
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Treatment 2 & 3 
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1-q=3/8                 
  
  
  
Red 
Blue 
The Belief Updating Task consists of five rounds. In each round, participants are presented with
a pair of computerized ‘urns’ containing blue and red colored balls. Each of these two urns
represents one of the two states of the world. The composition of the two urns is always constant,
with state ω = A represented by the urn containing more blue balls (5 blue and 3 red), and state
ω = B represented by the urn containing more red balls (5 red and 3 blue).
Priors
The five rounds differ from one another only in the exogenous prior probability that ω = A is
the true state, with this prior, p0, chosen from the set {16 , 26 , 36 , 46 , 56}. In each round, this prior
is known to the participant. The order of these rounds is randomly chosen for each individual.
Conditional on the prior, p0, one of the two urns is then chosen through the throw of a virtual die,
independently for each individual in each round.
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Belief Updating
In each round, after being informed of this prior probability, p0, the participant receives a sequence
of five partially informative signals, st, for t = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. These signals consist of draws, with
replacement, from the urn chosen for that round. Therefore, if the state of the world in a specific
round is ω = A then the chance of drawing a red ball is 38 and the chance of drawing a blue ball
is 58 for each of the draws in that round (see Figure 1).
In each round, we elicit the participant’s reported belief, rt, about the likelihood that state ω = A
is the correct state of the world, six times (i.e. for t = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5}). We first elicit her reported
belief, r0, directly after she is informed of the exogenous prior probability, p0, and then after she
receives each of her five signals we elicit rt for t = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. Overall, we therefore elicit 30
reported beliefs in Stage 1 from each individual (6 reported beliefs in each of 5 rounds).9
Incentives and Treatment Groups
The Belief Updating Task is identical across treatment groups, with the exception of the incentives
faced by participants. In each treatment, a participant’s payment consists of two components: (i)
an exogenous state-contingent payment, and (ii) an accuracy payment that depends on both their
stated belief and the true state.
In treatments T2.Combined and T3.Separate, the state-contingent payment is £10 in state ω = A
in comparison to £0.10 in state ω = B, making ω = A the more attractive state of the world. In
T1.Symmetric, participants receive an equal state-contingent payment of £0.10 in both states.
In all three treatments, participants receive nearly identical detailed written instructions describ-
ing the belief updating task as well as the two payment components. With the aim of ensuring that
participants understand the incentive environment, the instructions present the QSR as a choice
from a list of lotteries (this approach is also used, for example, by Armantier and Treich (2013)
and Offerman et al. (2009)). To this effect, subjects are presented with payment tables, which
inform them of the precise prospect they would face for each choice of rt, in increments of 0.01.
An abbreviated version of the three payment tables associated with each of the three treatment
groups is presented in Table 2.10 In order to represent all payments as integers in the instructions
and payment tables, we adopt the approach of using experimental points. The exchange rate is
6000 points = £1.
9Participants are not informed about the correct urn at the end of each round. They only receive feedback when
their payment is calculated at the very end of the experiment.
10Note, these payment tables are abbreviated in comparison to the tables presented to participants. The only
substantive difference is that Table 2 contains 21 rows, one for each 5% increment in the reported belief. In contrast,
the participants received payment tables that contained 101 rows, one for each 1% increase in the reported belief.
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Table 2 shows the difference between treatments T2.Combined and T3.Separate. While par-
ticipants in these two treatments face precisely the same incentives, the treatments differ in the
salience of the hedging motive. The only difference between the two treatments is the way in
which the payment information is summarised in the payment table. In T2.Combined, the pay-
ment table shows the combined payment from both (i) the exogenous state-contingent payment,
and (ii) the accuracy payment. Therefore, it summarizes the reduced form prospect associated
with each reported probability choice (rt) for subjects. In T3.Separate, the payment table shows
only the accuracy payment, so subjects need to integrate the two payments themselves to spot
the hedging opportunity.
Why do we have two treatments with identical incentives, differing only in presentation? The
T2.Combined treatment presents participants with incentives faced in the simplest and clear-
est way. This is desirable as it maximizes subject understanding of the incentives. In contrast,
T3.Separate lowers the salience of the hedging opportunity with the aim of inducing more accu-
rate belief reporting. Implementing both treatments serves multiple purposes: (i) it allows us to
evaluate the influence of the presentation of incentives on reported beliefs (i.e. whether a hedg-
ing motive affected reporting), (ii) it provides a way to test the internal validity of the correction
mechanism we use, and (iii) it provides us with a form of internal replication of our results, since
we can test each hypothesis more than once.
The Offerman et al. (2009) Correction Task (Stage 2)
In the second stage of the experiment we elicit twenty reported beliefs, r, for events with known
objective probabilities. In each of the three treatments, we estimate the functionR using reported
beliefs from Stage 2 elicited under the same incentive environment as in the Belief Updating Task
in Stage 1.
In Stage 2, participants are asked to report their probability judgment regarding the likelihood
that statements of the form: “the number the computer chooses will be between 1 and 75” (i.e.
p = 0.75), were true. For T1.Symmetric, this specific example essentially involves choosing r
from the list of prospects defined by 1−(1−r)20.75(1−r2). For T2.Combined and T3.Separate, this
example would involve choosing r from the list of prospects defined by x+1−(1−r)20.75(1−r2). As
in Stage 1, in each of the treatments, the Stage 2 payment table summarized the relevant payment
information. For each treatment, this payment table contained identical values in Stage 1 and
Stage 2. The twenty reported beliefs correspond to the objective probabilities 0.05, 0.1, . . . , 0.95.11
11These objective probabilities were presented in a random order. Furthermore, in the likelihood statement used,
such as the example in the main text, the interval given started at a randomly chosen lower bound (from the feasible
set of lower bounds for that specific objective probability). Nineteen of the twenty reported beliefs were unique, and
the twentieth was a randomly chosen repetition of one of the first nineteen.
13
4 Data and Descriptive Evidence
The experiment was conducted at the UCL-ELSE experimental laboratory in London as well as
at the WZB-TU laboratory in Berlin. There were two sessions for each of the three Treatment
groups at each location, making twelve sessions and 222 participants in total. At each location,
participants were solicited through an online database using ORSEE (Greiner, 2015) and the
experiment was run using the experimental software, z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). On average,
sessions lasted approximately 1.5 hours and the average participant earned £19.7 in London and
e20.3 in Berlin. Realized payments ranged between £11 [e11] and £34 [e34].
One challenge faced by belief updating studies is ensuring that subjects understand and engage
with the task. In order to facilitate this, we were careful to ensure that the instructions received
were as clear and simple as possible. Nonetheless, there remained a non-trivial fraction of partic-
ipants who took decisions to update in the ‘incorrect’ direction upon receiving new information.
In order to ensure that the behavior we are studying is reflective of actual updating behavior
of individuals who understood and engaged with the task, we restrict our sample for our main
analysis by removing rounds where an individual updates in the incorrect direction.12 We also
estimate all the main results on the full sample, and the general patterns of behavior are similar.
While randomization to treatment group should ensure that the samples are balanced on ob-
servable and unobservable characteristics, Table 9 in the Appendices provides a check that the
selection of our preferred sample has not substantially biased our treatments groups. Overall, the
treatments appear to be balanced, with the exception that individuals in T3.Separate are more
likely to speak English at home than individuals in T2.Combined.
5 Empirical Specification
In this section, we first discuss the calibration exercise used to correct the reported beliefs. Second,
we describe the core estimation equations used in our analysis. These build on the work byMöbius
et al. (2014) as their data has a similar structure to ours. One key difference in our data is the
exogenous assignment of the participants’ entire information set. We exploit this feature of our
data to address endogeneity issues that can arise when studying belief updating.
12More specifically, for our preferred sample, we remove all individuals who make more than five out of twenty five
updating decisions in the incorrect direction. This comprised eighteen percent of our subjects. This is comparable to
the twenty five percent of individuals who make at least one mistake out of four decisions in Möbius et al. (2014).
For those who updated in the wrong direction five or fewer times, we remove only the round of decisions in which
they made a mistake. This removes 210 out of the remaining 910 rounds. We estimate our results on the full sample
and all the main results remain the same.
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The Belief Correction Procedure
The belief correction procedure that we adopt involves assuming a flexible parametric form for the
participants’ utility and probability weighting functions in order to estimate their personal belief-
distortion function (this is theR function discussed in Equation 8 in Appendix B.2.1). We estimate
this function for each individual separately in order to correct the reported beliefs at the individual
level. Essentially, we are simply fitting a curve through each subject’s belief elicitation distortion,
for the relevant incentive environment. Appendix B.2.4 contains a more detailed discussion of
the estimation of the belief correction function, and illustrates the main ideas through Figures
5 and 6 (for further details about this procedure, see Offerman et al. (2009) and Kothiyal et al.
(2011)).
In Figure 2 we plot the CDFs of the uncorrected reported beliefs as well as the reported beliefs that
have been corrected at the individual level. The left panel displays the distribution of reported
beliefs, prior to correction, in each of the three treatments. One interesting feature of this figure
is that, in spite of the fact that subjects in T2.Combined and T3.Separate are offered precisely
the same incentives, the distributions of reported beliefs of these two groups are significantly
different from one another (Mann-Whitney rank-sum test, p < 0.01). The larger mass of reported
beliefs to the left of 50 in T2.Combined suggests that individuals are more likely to respond to
the hedging opportunity when it is more salient.
Figure 2: CDFs of Corrected and Uncorrected Reported Beliefs
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The right panel shows the corrected beliefs. It suggests that the belief correction approach was
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successful in removing the strong hedging influence in T2.Combined. After correction, the beliefs
in the two treatments with identical incentives, T2.Combined and T3.Separate, are similar.
This evidence underscores the usefulness of the belief correction mechanism in reducing bias in
reported beliefs when there is a salient hedging opportunity.
With the corrected beliefs in hand, we proceed to the main analysis. The analysis is done using
both the corrected and uncorrected beliefs.13
Core Estimation Specifications
Our core estimation equations aim to test for systematic patterns in updating behavior, within the
framework of Equation 1. First, we examine whether there are systematic deviations from Bayes’
rule in updating behavior, independently of having a stake in one of the two states of the world.
Second, we assess the influence that having a stake in one of the two states of the world has by (i)
testing for an asymmetry in updating within treatments where there is a state-contingent stake
(i.e. T2.Combined and T3.Separate); and (ii) testing whether there are differences in updating
behavior between the treatments with and without a state-contingent stake.
The first estimation equation follows directly from Equation 1, allowing us to test the asymmetric
updating hypothesis, and also to test for other common deviations from Bayes’ rule, such as a
confirmatory bias or base rate neglect:
p˜ii,j,t+1 = δp˜ii,j,t + γaq˜ · 1(si,j,t+1 = a)− γbq˜ · 1(si,j,t+1 = b) + i,j,t+1 (2)
where p˜ii,j,t = logit(pii,j,t) and q˜ = log( q1−q ); j refers to a round of decisions; and the errors, ijt,
are clustered at the individual (i) level.
To determine the belief updating pattern within each incentive environment, we estimate this
equation separately for each treatment. Then to test for significant differences between the co-
efficients in different incentive environments, we pool our sample and interact the treatment
variable with all three of the coefficients in this equation (i.e. δ,γa, and γb). This provides us with
a test of whether the parameters differ between either of the two asymmetric treatments and
the symmetric treatment.
13The analysis using the uncorrected beliefs is essentially an analysis using beliefs elicited using the QSR, which
is by far the most common approach used in the belief elicitation literature to date. Therefore, these results have
greater comparability with much of the experimental literature. However, in line with the discussion above, our
preferred specification uses the corrected beliefs as these should be closer to the subjects’ true beliefs.
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Endogeneity of the Lagged Belief
One potential concern with the identification of the parameters of Equation 2 is that the right
hand side contains lagged versions of the dependent variable. This implies that there is a pos-
sible endogeneity of the lagged beliefs, pii,j,t, if they are correlated with the error term (i.e. if
E{p˜ii,j,ti,j,t+1} 6= 0).14 If this is the case, it can result in biased and inconsistent estimators for
the parameters of the regression. Our experiment was designed to avoid this issue by virtue of
exogenously assigning the subjects’ entire information set. This allows us to use the exogenously
assigned prior probability of state ω = A being the true state, pi,j,t=0, as well as the sequence of
signals observed, st, to construct an instrument for the lagged belief, pii,j,t, in Specification 2. We
do this by calculating the objective Bayesian posterior, given the agent’s information set at time
t, and using this as an instrument for her belief, pii,j,t.
The approach used here also avoids a second type of endogeneity issue that can arise when
studying belief updating when the states of the world are a functions of personal characteristics
(e.g. when examining beliefs regarding individual attributes, such as one’s own skills, IQ, or
beauty) or personal choices. When this is the case, the conditional probability of observing a
specific signal depends on the state of the world, and therefore can be correlated with personal
characteristics (see Appendix C and earlier versions of this paper for further discussion of this
issue).
6 Results
Table 3 reports the results from estimating Equation 2 for each of the treatment groups separately.
These estimates describe the updating behavior of the average individual in each of the three
treatment groups. Within each treatment group, we report the results for both the OLS (top
panel) and the IV (bottom panel) estimations discussed above. Columns (1a), (2a) and (3a) use
the uncorrected reported beliefs, while columns (1b), (2b) and (3b) use the corrected beliefs.
Every coefficient in the table is statistically different from 0 at the 1% level. Since our primary
interest is in testing whether the coefficients are different from 1, in this table we use asterisks to
reflect the significance of a t-test of whether a coefficient is statistically different from 1.
Perhaps the most striking features of this table are: (i) the similarity in the updating patterns
across the three treatment groups; and (ii) that for the average individual, the observed updating
behavior is close to Bayesian in all three treatment groups. The p-values from the test of the
null hypothesis, H0 : γa = γb, show that in none of the three treatment groups do we observe a
14For example, this would be the case if there is individual heterogeneity in the way individuals respond to infor-
mation. We provide evidence below that this individual heterogeneity is present.
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statistically significant difference (at the 5% level) between the responsiveness to the signals in
favor of ω = A and ω = B (i.e. we don’t observe asymmetric updating).
Table 3: Average Updating Behavior across Treatments
T1: SYMMETRIC T2: COMBINED T3: SEPARATE
Reported Corrected Reported Corrected Reported Corrected
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b)
OLS
δ 0.90 0.90 0.86 0.86 0.91 0.93
(0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.04)*** (0.04)*** (0.03)*** (0.02)***
γa 1.12 1.09 1.05 1.06 1.25 1.16
(0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.14)* (0.11)
γb 1.21 1.17 1.19 1.12 1.20 1.13
(0.13)* (0.11) (0.15) (0.13) (0.12) (0.10)
p (H0 : γa = γb) 0.30 0.32 0.20 0.48 0.58 0.73
N 1,075 1,075 1,285 1,285 1,140 1,140
R2 0.71 0.73 0.73 0.74 0.81 0.84
IV
δ 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.99
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
γa 1.12 1.09 1.08 1.02 1.22 1.14
(0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.13)* (0.11)
γb 1.21 1.16 1.11 1.12 1.18 1.11
(0.12)* (0.11) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.10)
p (H0 : γa = γb) 0.30 0.31 0.76 0.25 0.63 0.74
N 1,075 1,075 1,285 1,285 1,140 1,140
1st Stage F 61.38 84.04 107.98 107.01 76.90 95.45
(i) Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the individual level).
(ii) All coefficients are significantly different from 0 at the 1% level. Therefore, t-tests of the null
hypothesis (H0: Coefficient = 1) are reported: * = 10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%.
(iii) The rows corresponding to p (H0 : γa = γb) report the p-statistic from a t-test of the equality
of the coefficients γa and γb (i.e. a test of the asymmetric updating hypothesis).
Both the OLS results in the top panel and the IV results in the bottom panel indicate that the re-
sponsiveness to new information was, on average, not statistically different to that of a Bayesian,
since both γa and γb are not significantly different to 1 at the 5 percent level. The primary differ-
ence between the OLS results and the IV results is that, while the OLS estimates suggest a small
degree of base rate neglect across all three treatments (δ < 1), once we control for the possible
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sources of endogeneity discussed above using our instrumental variable strategy, the estimates
are no longer indicative of base rate neglect. Since the OLS estimates may be biased, the IV es-
timates represent our preferred results. The first stage regression results for the IV estimation
are reported in the Appendices in Table 8, indicating that we don’t have a weak instrument issue.
Importantly, however, the form of endogeneity addressed by IV estimation only pertains to po-
tential biases in the δ parameter, since it addresses endogeneity in the prior belief variable. It is
therefore reassuring that for the estimates of our primary parameters of interest, namely γa and
γb, the estimates are largely consistent across all the estimation specifications reported in Table
3. A reason for this is that the signals, si,j,t+1, that subjects receive are always completely exoge-
nous, both across rounds, and with respect to the subject’s personal characteristics. Furthermore,
the distribution of signals observed is also exogenous, and balanced in expectation. This helps
to avoid other sources of endogeneity (see, e.g., Appendix C) and to alleviate the influence of
other potential confounding belief updating biases (see, e.g., Coutts (2019) for a discussion of
the influence of signal distributions on belief updating).
It is worth noticing that although we observe a substantial difference in the levels of the corrected
and uncorrected beliefs in Figure 2 above, the estimates for updating in Table 3 are quite similar
for the corrected and uncorrected beliefs. One explanation for this apparent inconsistency is the
following. If the degree of hedging by an individual is similar for both the prior and posterior
belief, then the correction could have a sizeable effect on the levels of both beliefs, but not result in
the large difference in the estimated updating parameters, since updating pertains to the change
in the belief rather than the level.
A Model Free Test of the Asymmetric Updating Hypothesis
In order to alleviate the potential concern that these results are dependent on the functional
form of our empirical specification, we conduct a model-free test of the the asymmetric updating
hypothesis. Perhaps the simplest and most direct test of this hypothesis is obtained by directly
comparing the posterior beliefs formed in two scenarios where the information set is identical,
but the rewards associated with one of the states of the world is varied. Our data is well suited
for conducting this exercise.
We do this by considering a comparison of information-set-equivalent posterior beliefs after indi-
viduals have received only (i) the exogenous prior and (ii) a single ball draw. This allows us to test
the asymmetric updating hypothesis while remaining agnostic regarding the process that guides
belief updating, testing only whether it is symmetric. Our data allows us to conduct two com-
parisons of information-set-equivalent posterior beliefs—a within-subject and a between-subject
comparison.
First, we can compare posterior beliefs, pi1, formed with identical information sets {p0, s1} between
19
treatment groups, where the payments associated with states of the world differ. For example, we
can compare the average posterior formed after an identical prior, e.g. p0 = 16 , and an identical
signal, e.g. s1 = a (i.e. a blue ball), across treatments.
Second, we can compare information-set-equivalent posterior beliefs within treatment groups.
This comparison involves comparing pi1 after {p0 = p, s1 = s}with 1−pi1 after {p0 = 1−p, s1 = sc}
where sc is the complementary signal to s.15 For example, we can compare the posterior, pi1,
formed after a prior of p0 = 16 and the signal s1 = a (i.e. a blue ball), with 1 − pi1 after a
prior of p0 = 56 and the signal s1 = b (i.e. a red ball). To see why this comparison involves a
comparison of information-set-equivalent posterior beliefs, recall that the experiment is designed
to be completely symmetric in terms of information, with the informativeness of a red ball exactly
the same as a blue ball. Therefore, if an individual updates symmetrically, then pi1|{p0=p,s1=s} =
1 − pi1|{p0=1−p,s1=sc}. This prediction does not rely on Bayes’ rule (although it is an implication
of Bayes’ rule), but rather only requires symmetric updating, and therefore it provides us with a
non-parametric test of the asymmetric updating hypothesis.
Figure 3 depicts both of these comparisons, with each group of six bars collecting together the
relevant information-set-equivalent groups. Each bar presents the mean posterior belief for that
group, as well as a 95% confidence interval around the mean.Each group is labeled on the x-axis
by the prior belief associated with the ‘red’ bars, which correspond to the information sets that
include a red ball as a signal (i.e. s1 = b). The ‘blue’ bars report the mean of 1−pi1 for information
sets containing a blue ball (i.e. s1 = a) and for these bars the x-axis label corresponds to 1− p0.
Within each group, the first two bars represent the average posterior beliefs in T1.Symmetric; the
second pair of bars depict the same for T2.Combined; and the third pair of bars for T3.Separate.
The results displayed in Figure 3 show that there are no systematic differences between posterior
beliefs within information-set-equivalent groups, neither within nor between treatment groups.
Furthermore, when testing non-parametrically whether there are differences within or between
treatment groups for information-set-equivalent groups, none of the 45 relevant binary compar-
isons16 are significant at the 5 percent significance level under a Mann-Whitney test, suggesting
that we cannot reject the hypothesis that the posterior beliefs within information-set-equivalent
groups are drawn from the same distribution. This lends support to the results described above
which indicate that we fail to find evidence in support of the asymmetric updating hypothesis.
15Therefore, if s = a then sc = b and vice versa.
16For these comparisons, for each exogenous prior, we test the following binary comparisons: (i) within treatment
group, we test between those that received the s1 = a and s1 = b signals (3 × 5 binary comparisons); (ii) for those
that received the same signal, s1, we test between treatment groups (6× 5 binary comparisons).
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Figure 3: Comparison of Beliefs after the Receipt of a Single Signal and an Exogenous Prior
0
20
40
60
80
C
or
re
ct
ed
 B
el
ie
f
1/6 2/6 3/6 4/6 5/6
Exogenous Prior
T1 Red T2 Red T3 Red
T1 Blue T2 Blue T3 Blue
Notes: (i) Bar denotes 95 percent confidence interval around the mean; (ii) Beliefs after blue balls reflect (100 - belief).
Robustness Exercises
In addition to this model-free test, to check for the robustness of the belief updating results for
the average individual presented in Table 3, we conducted several robustness exercises. These
exercises, and their corresponding results, are discussed in detail in Appendix A.
The first exercise examines whether the results from the main specification described in Equation
2 are robust to first differencing the dependent variable (i.e. this imposes the assumption that δ =
1). The second subsection extends the main empirical specification to allow for individual-specific
updating parameters. For both of these specifications, an ex post power analysis is conducted,
reporting the MDE for a significance level of α = 0.05 and a power of κ = 0.8. The third subsection
pools all the observations across the three treatments together, and then tests whether the average
updating parameters differ across treatments by interacting treatment group dummies with the
regressors of the main specification described in Equation 2.
The results from all of these exercises are highly consistent with those in Table 3 and fail to
provide any evidence in favor of an asymmetry in updating.
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Heterogeneity in Updating Behavior
In order to investigate whether the aggregate results are masking heterogeneity in updating be-
havior, we estimate Specification 2 at the individual level and collect the parameters. The distribu-
tions of these individual level parameters are reported in Figure 4. Perhaps the most conspicuous
feature of this figure is the fact that all three treatment groups display such similar parame-
ter distributions in each of the panels—i.e. for each of the parameters. Testing for differences
between the underlying distributions from which the parameters are drawn in the different treat-
ment groups fails to detect any statistically significant differences in any of the four panels.17 The
upper-right panel shows that the majority of individuals have an estimated δ parameter in the
interval [0.6, 1.1], with a large proportion of these concentrated around 1 in all three treatment
groups. The two left-hand panels show that there is substantially more individual heterogeneity
in the estimated γa and γb parameters, which are dispersed over the interval [0, 3.5] in all three
treatments.
Figure 4: Distributions of Individual Level Updating Parameters.
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
C
D
F
0 1 2 3 4 5
Coefficient on gamma(b)
CDF of individual gamma(b) coefficients
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
C
D
F
0 .25 .5 .75 1 1.25 1.5
Coefficient on delta
CDF of individual delta coefficients
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
C
D
F
0 1 2 3 4 5
Coefficient on gamma(a)
CDF of individual  gamma(a) coefficients
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
C
D
F
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
Difference between gamma(a) and gamma(b) 
CDF of gamma(a) - gamma(b) coefficients
T1 SYMMETRIC T2 COMBINED
T3 SEPARATE
With such a large degree of variation in the individual level parameters, a natural conjecture to
make is that, while we do not observe asymmetric updating at the aggregate level, it is entirely
plausible that there may be a subsample of individuals who are optimistic updaters and another
17More specifically, for each of the four panels in Figure 4, we conducted three binary Mann-Whitney tests compar-
ing each possible pair of treatments. In total, these twelve statistical tests failed to detect any significant difference
in the underlying parameter distributions between the treatment groups at the 10% level. In addition, another
twenty-four similar tests for differences in the mean (t-test) and median (chi-squared) of the underlying distribu-
tions between treatments fail to detect any statistically significant differences at the 10% level.
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subsample of individuals who are pessimistic updaters. If these two subsamples are of a similar
size and their bias is of a similar magnitude, we would observe no asymmetry at the aggregate
level. The lower-right panel of Figure 4 suggests that this is not the case by plotting the distri-
bution of the individual level difference between the γa and γb parameters. The majority of the
distribution is concentrated in a narrow interval around 0 for all three treatment groups, sug-
gesting that there is no asymmetry for any sizable subsample. Furthermore, this conclusion is
supported by the fact there are no significant differences between the distributions of updating
parameters observed across the three treatments in any of the four panels, since the motive for a
‘good-news, bad-news’ effect is switched off in the T1.Symmetric treatment.
7 Discussion
7.1 Heterogeneous results observed in the asymmetric updating literature
A central question that emerges from the discussion above is why we observe no evidence of a
‘good-news, bad-news’ effect here, while some other influential contributions to this literature
have found evidence for such an effect. More generally, Benjamin (2019) points out that the
evidence in this nascent literature is so far very mixed. In the economics literature, three papers
find evidence in favor of stronger inference from good news: Eil and Rao (2011), Möbius et al.
(2014) and Charness and Dave (2017).18 In contrast, there are three papers that find evidence of
stronger inference from bad news: Ertac (2011), Kuhnen (2015) and Coutts (2019). Furthermore,
in addition to the current paper, there are four other papers that find no evidence in favor of a
preference-biased asymmetry in belief updating: Grossman and Owens (2012), Schwardmann
and Van der Weele (2019), Gotthard-Real (2017) and Buser et al. (2018).19 In the psychology
literature, however, there appears to be a near-consensus arguing that there is an asymmetry
in belief updating in favor of good news (see, e.g., Sharot et al. (2011), Sharot et al. (2012),
Kuzmanovic et al. (2015), and Marks and Baines (2017), amongst others). A notable exception
is Shah et al. (2016) who argue that many of the contributions to this literature suffer from
methodological concerns; Garrett and Sharot (2017) offer a rebuttal, claiming that optimistically
biased updating is robust to these concerns.
The aim of the experiment discussed in this paper is not to isolate the contextual features that
generate these heterogeneous results. Rather, it is to contribute robust evidence on updating
18Mayraz (2013) also presents evidence in favor of individuals forming motivated beliefs that are distorted towards
more desirable states, however in his experiment one cannot calculate the Bayesian posterior, so it is less comparable
to the other studies in this literature.
19Additionally, while Eil and Rao (2011) found evidence of an asymmetry in favor of good-news in the domain of
beliefs about one’s own Beauty, they did not find evidence of an asymmetry in the domain of beliefs about one’s own
IQ.
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for one particular domain—belief updating when states differ in terms of the financial rewards
they bring. Nevertheless, it is important to consider the body of evidence as a whole to assess
whether this reveals a systematic pattern that might organize these heterogeneous results. Be-
low, I offer a discussion of some of the candidate explanations for the heterogeneity. In general,
these explanations fall into two categories: (1) the hypothesis that contextual factors mediate
asymmetric updating: belief updating is influenced by preferences, but this preference-biased up-
dating is switched on or off by contextual factors. (2) the hypothesis that asymmetric updating
is sometimes misidentified: belief updating is not actually influenced by preferences, but rather,
what appears to be asymmetric updating is driven by a different cognitive bias (e.g. prior-biased
inference). The majority of the explanations discussed below fall into the first category.
7.1.1 Information structure
One avenue of enquiry for attempting to reconcile the results is to consider the differences in the
information structures across experiments. For example, while several of the studies adopt a two-
state bookbag-and-poker-chip experimental paradigm, Ertac (2011) uses a three-state structure
with signals that are perfectly informative about one state, and Eil and Rao (2011) consider a
ten-state updating task with binary signals. However, this does not seem to be driving the differ-
ences in results, since we observe heterogeneous results amongst papers with similar information
structures—e.g. restricting attention only to the papers with two-state structures with binary sig-
nals (e.g. the current paper, Möbius et al. (2014), Gotthard-Real (2017), Coutts (2019)) yields
mixed results.
7.1.2 Priors
Focusing only on two-state experiments, there is substantial variation in average prior belief
across experiments, with Coutts (2019) (by design) observing relatively low average priors in
comparison to Möbius et al. (2014), for example. If belief updating is influenced by prior beliefs
(e.g. a confirmatory bias), then what looks like preference-biased belief updating may be driven
by a completely different cognitive deviation from Bayesian updating, namely prior-biased updat-
ing (see, e.g., Benjamin (2019) Section 8). However, if we look at the papers that find evidence
for preference-biased updating, Charness and Dave (2017) do find evidence in favor of prior-
biased updating, while Eil and Rao (2011) and Möbius et al. (2014) do not find evidence of
prior-biased updating. This speaks against the explanation that what appears to be asymmetric
belief updating due to preferences is actually driven by a confirmatory bias.
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7.1.3 Ambiguity
One important dimension in the belief updating literature is whether subjects are provided with
exogenous point estimate priors or update from subjectively formed prior beliefs. There are ad-
vantages and disadvantages to each approach. The former brings increased experimental control
and improved causal identification, but this comes at the expense of reduced realism and perhaps
a slightly less natural setting.20
This discussion highlights a key assumption that is typically made in this literature, namely that
subjects are probabilistically sophisticated and therefore update as if they hold a point estimate
prior. In cases where subjects must form their own subjective prior belief, this assumption is not
innocuous. If, instead, the beliefs subjects hold are not precise point estimates (e.g. if subjects
hold ambiguous prior beliefs over an interval), then simple Bayesian updating may no longer be
the most appropriate benchmark model. First, there are several competing theoretical models of
belief updating in the presence of ambiguity with differing predictions, e.g. full Bayesian updating
(Jaffray, 1989; Pires, 2002) and maximum likelihood updating (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1993),
and some recent experimental evidence testing between them (Ngangoue, 2018; Liang, 2019).
Second, one might postulate that there is greater scope for motivated reasoning when one is
updating beliefs from ambiguous priors (or ambiguous signals) in comparison to belief updating
from exogenously endowed point estimate priors (and signals with clearly defined informative-
ness).
However, the existing evidence suggests that the presence or absence of ambiguity is not a uni-
fying explanation for the differing results. Even within the set of papers with home-grown sub-
jective priors (e.g. Eil and Rao (2011), Ertac (2011), Möbius et al. (2014), and Coutts (2019)),
the results are very mixed.
7.1.4 Domain of belief updating
Typically, we study belief formation as if it is domain-independent. However, it seems natural to
consider the possibility that humans evolved to process information about their physical environ-
ment differently from information about their self and their social environment. For example, the
mental processes involved in forming a belief about the likelihood of future rainfall may be funda-
mentally different to those involved in forming a strategic belief about the probability that another
individual will be trustworthy in a specific scenario. Some papers in this literature have explored
this question by asking whether we update differently about a given fundamental characteristic of
one’s own self in comparison to the same fundamental characteristic of another individual (e.g.,
20An interesting recent contribution by Le Yaouanq and Schwardmann (2019) proposes amethodology for studying
belief updating in more natural settings, while still maintaining experimental control and permitting a comparison
with Bayesian updating.
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Möbius et al. (2014) and Coutts (2019)). Furthermore, recent theoretical and experimental work
has studied how individuals attribute outcomes to their self versus an external fundamental from
their physical or social environment (see, e.g., Heidhues et al. (2018), Hestermann and Le Yaouanq
(2018), and Coutts et al. (2019)).
The influence of the domain on belief updating may matter for the asymmetric updating literature
because this literature considers updating scenarios pertaining to both the environment (with
‘good’ states typically represented by high monetary payments) and to the self (where ‘good’
states pertain to a desirable individual characteristic). One might posit that asymmetric updating
only manifests in certain domains. While the studies focused on belief updating where only
financial rewards are varied generally don’t find a ‘good-news, bad-news’ effect (e.g. this paper,
Gotthard-Real (2017), Coutts (2019)), even within the group of studies considering beliefs about
the self, the evidence is mixed (e.g. Eil and Rao (2011), Ertac (2011), Möbius et al. (2014), and
Coutts (2019)).
7.1.5 Outcomes and stake size
One caveat to the results reported here is that the financial stakes in play are not extremely large.
Coutts (2019) investigates the role played by stakes, increasing the stake size up to $80 and
finds no evidence that it plays a role. This suggests that stake size may not be a pivotal concern.
Nonetheless, it is worth keeping this caveat in mind when interpreting the results.
7.2 Addressing hedging
One challenge when studying belief updating in the presence of state-dependent stakes is the
inherent hedging motive. Various approaches have been adopted to try to deal with it. Typically,
the papers considering belief updating about an ego-related characteristic (e.g. IQ) rely on the
(very reasonable) implicit assumption that hedging across the ego utility and monetary utility
domains will be minimal.
Amongst the studies considering monetary state-dependent stakes, two different approaches to
dealing with this challenge have been adopted. Coutts (2019) follows the method suggested in
Blanco et al. (2010), which involves partitioning the world such that the participant will either
be paid according to their belief or according to the state-dependent prize, but never both. In
this paper we instead follow the method developed by Offerman et al. (2009) and Kothiyal et al.
(2011). Both these approaches are theoretically valid for alleviating the influence of hedging
under the assumptions they make; both approaches have advantages and drawbacks. However,
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neither Coutts (2019) nor the current paper finds support for a larger responsiveness to good-
news. In addition, while the possibility of hedging certainly deserves attention when interpreting
the results, there are several reasons why the results discussed above suggest that hedging is
not a driving factor behind the absence of a good-news, bad-news effect. The observed absence
of any asymmetry in updating within either of the two Asymmetric treatments for either the
uncorrected or corrected beliefs, as well as the consistency in updating patterns observed across
all three treatments is not easily explained by a combination of a ‘good-news, bad-news’ effect
and hedging.
7.3 Concluding Remarks
The main finding of this paper is that we find no evidence for asymmetric updating when states
differ only in their financial rewards. Instead, we find that the updating behavior of the average
individual is approximately Bayesian, irrespective of the presence or absence of differing finan-
cial stakes. Taken in the context of the literature as a whole, where a ‘good-news, bad-news’
effect is sometimes observed in other domains, this suggests that belief updating may be context
dependent. One interesting avenue for future research, therefore, is to consider whether dif-
fering evolutionary considerations across contexts may have generated differing belief updating
processes. For example, one evolutionary reason why there could be differences in belief updat-
ing about ego-relevant characteristics in comparison to belief updating about external states that
differ in financial rewards is the idea that ego maintainance can yield evolutionary benefits. A
positive asymmetry in updating about one’s self would lead to overconfident beliefs, and several
authors have posited that maintaining a high self-confidence may be associated with evolution-
ary advantages (see, e.g., Bernardo and Welch (2001); Heifetz et al. (2007); Johnson and Fowler
(2011); Burks et al. (2013); Schwardmann and Van der Weele (2019), Solda et al. (2019), Coff-
man et al. (2020)). In contrast, asymmetric updating about external states of the world would
lead to overoptimism which is likely to lead to costly mistakes. Further research is needed to help
enrich our understanding of precisely how context influences belief updating.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A: Robustness Checks
The empirical specification used in the main text of this paper assumes that updating follows the
flexible parametric process described in Equation 1. This specification allows for a wide range of
deviations from Bayes’ rule, as discussed in Section 2. In this section we conduct several exercises
to test for the robustness of the main results.
The first subsection examines whether the results from the main specification described in Equa-
tion 2 are robust to first differencing the dependent variable (i.e. this considers how new in-
formation influences the change in beliefs, imposing the assumption that δ = 1). The second
subsection extends the main empirical specification to allow for individual-specific updating pa-
rameters. The third subsection pools all the observations across the three treatments together,
and then tests whether the average updating parameters differ across treatments, by interacting
treatment group dummies with the regressors of the main specification described in Equation 2.
Table 4: First Difference Specification and Power Calculations
T1: SYMMETRIC T2: COMBINED T3: SEPARATE
OLS IV DIFF OLS IV DIFF OLS IV DIFF
(1a) (1b) (1c) (2a) (2b) (2c) (3a) (3b) (3c)
δ 0.90 0.99 0.86 0.99 0.93 0.99
(0.03)*** (0.03) (0.04)*** (0.02) (0.02)*** (0.02)
γa 1.09 1.09 1.09 1.06 1.02 1.01 1.16 1.14 1.13
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10)
γb − γa 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.10 0.11 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
p(γa = γb) 0.32 0.31 0.32 0.48 0.25 0.25 0.73 0.74 0.75
MDE (κ = 0.8) 0.24 0.22 0.22 0.27 0.25 0.26 0.24 0.22 0.22
R2 0.73 0.31 0.74 0.21 0.84 0.34
1st Stage F 84.04 107.01 95.45
N 1,075 1,075 1,075 1,285 1,285 1,285 1,140 1,140 1,140
(i) Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the individual level)
(ii) T-tests of H0: δ = 1; γa = 1; γb − γa = 0 indicated by * = 10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%
(iii) MDE reports the minimum detectable effect size for a power of κ.
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Robustness Check 1: First-Differences Specification and Power Calculation
This section of the robustness checks serves two purposes. The first purpose is to check for the
robustness of the results from the core empirical specification to the use of a first differences
specification (DIFF), which essentially involves imposing the assumption that δ = 1. The second
purpose of this section is to report the size of the minimum detectable effect (MDE) from power
calculations for both our main OLS and IV empirical specification, and the DIFF specification.
One of the challenges in carrying out a statistical analysis of belief updating behavior is that an
individual’s current posterior belief necessarily depends upon her prior belief, which in turn is
the result of updating in response to past information. Therefore, when estimating a paramet-
ric belief updating function, one concern is that the individual’s prior belief is correlated with
unobservables. In the main text, we devoted substantial space to discussing how the experiment
was designed explicitly to address this concern by generating a completely exogenous information
set, facilitating a natural instrumental variables (IV) approach to estimation. The first differences
specification results presented here serve to further complement the IV analysis, since the DIFF
specification avoids the potential endogeneity issue by removing the lagged belief from the set of
dependent variables in the regression.
In columns (#a) and (#b), Table 4 repeats the OLS and IV results from Table 3 for the corrected
beliefs, with one minor change to the core specification in Equation 2. Here we report, instead,
the results for the equivalent specification:
p˜ii,j,t+1 = δp˜ii,j,t + γaq̂ − (γb − γa)q˜ · 1(si,j,t+1 = b) + i,j,t+1 (3)
where p˜ii,j,t = logit(pii,j,t) and q̂ = log( q1−q )·[1(si,j,t = a)−1(si,j,t = b)]; while as above, q˜ = log( q1−q );
j refers to a round of decisions; t counts the decision numbers within a round, and the errors
ijt+1 are clustered at the individual (i) level. The difference γb − γa denotes a single parameter
estimated in the regression, but is denoted as the difference between γb and γa as this is the
natural way to think about this parameter in the context of the discussion above (i.e. the difference
between how subjects update in response to ‘bad news’ and ‘good news’).
The reason for the rearrangement of the equation is that, while it is equivalent21 to the specifica-
tion in Equation 2, it displays the test of the difference between γa and γb more clearly (i.e. the
21Notice that the regression coefficients and standard errors on δ and γa are the same in Tables 3 and 4 (where
we are only considering the corrected beliefs). Furthermore, we can see the equivalence from the following simple
rearrangement:
p˜ii,j,t+1 = δp˜ii,j,t + γaq˜ · 1(si,j,t+1 = a)− γbq˜ · 1(si,j,t+1 = b)
= δp˜ii,j,t + γaq˜ · 1(si,j,t+1 = a)− γaq˜ · 1(si,j,t+1 = b) + γaq˜ · 1(si,j,t+1 = b)− γbq˜ · 1(si,j,t+1 = b)
= δp˜ii,j,t + γaq˜ · [1(si,j,t+1 = a)− q˜ · 1(si,j,t+1 = b)] + [γa − γb] · q˜ · 1(si,j,t+1 = b)
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test of the asymmetric updating hypothesis), and thereby also facilitates calculating the MDE. In
Table 3, we have presented the MDE for a power of κ = 0.8.
Columns (#c) report the results for the first difference specification, which imposes the restriction
that δ = 1:
∆p˜ii,j,t+1 = γaq̂ − (γb − γa)q˜ · 1(si,j,t+1 = b) + i,j,t+1 (4)
where ∆p˜ii,j,t+1 = logit(pii,j,t+1)− logit(pii,j,t) and q̂ = log( q1−q ) · [1(si,j,t = a)− 1(si,j,t = b)]; j refers
to a round of decisions; t counts the decision numbers within a round, and the errors ijt+1 are
clustered at the individual (i) level.
The results indicate that the γb − γa parameter is robust to the different empirical specifications
adopted, and also doesn’t vary substantially across treatment groups. In all treatment groups,
and for each of the empirical specifications considered, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that
this parameter is equal to zero, which implies that we do not find support for the asymmetric
updating hypothesis. Furthermore, we calculate the MDE for each specification, considering a
significance level of α = 0.05 and a power of κ = 0.8. Under these assumptions, the MDE for the
difference between the γb and γa parameters in each of the regressions considered in isolation
ranges between 0.22 and 0.27. As a result, we cannot conclusively reject the possibility that there
exists a small asymmetry in updating; however none of our results provide any support for this
conclusion.
Robustness Check 2: Allowing for Individual-Specific Updating Parameters
As discussed above, one reason we might think that endogeneity of the lagged belief could lead
to biased estimates is if there is heterogeneity in individual updating behavior and this leads to a
correlation between the unobserved error term and the lagged belief variable amongst the regres-
sors. We have tried to address this issue above using, firstly, an instrumental variable approach,
and secondly, a first differences empirical specification. However, since the data were collected
in the form of a panel of belief updates for each individual, the data lends itself to controlling
for individual-specific behavior through exploiting the panel. A typical fixed effects model is not
appropriate here, as it is not the level of the regression that shifts from individual to individual.
However, we can include individual-specific updating parameters to control for the slope to shift
at the individual level. This allows us to extract the individual heterogeneity in how responsive
individuals are to their prior belief, and to new information in general, and reduce the possible
bias in the main parameter of interest, the average difference in responsiveness to ‘bad news’
and ‘good news’ : γb − γa. With this in mind, our third robustness check involves estimating the
following empirical specification:
3
p˜ii,j,t+1 = δip˜ii,j,t + γi q̂ − (γb − γa)q˜ · 1(si,j,t+1 = b) + i,j,t+1 (5)
where δi and γi are estimated at the individual level, and the remaining parameters and variables
are defined as above. The results from this exercise using the corrected beliefs are reported in
Table 5.
These results are very consistent with the estimates from the core specification, as well as from the
DIFF specification in Robustness Check 2. In summary, all the empirical estimates provide support
for the same underlying story that the data collected in this experiment provide no support for
the asymmetric updating hypothesis in this context.
Table 5: Allowing for Individual-Specific Updating Parameters.
T1 SYMMETRIC T2 COMBINED T3 SEPARATE T2+T3
(1) (2) (3) (4)
γb − γa 0.09 0.14 -0.04 0.06
(0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.07)
p(γa = γb) 0.35 0.18 0.67 0.41
MDE (κ = 0.8) 0.28 0.29 0.26 0.20
MDE (κ = 0.9) 0.33 0.33 0.30 0.23
N 1,075 1,285 1,140 2,425
R2 0.80 0.84 0.89 0.86
(i) Standard errors in parentheses
(ii) T-tests of H0: Coefficient = 0 reported: * = 10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%
(iii) MDE reports the minimum detectable effect size for a power of κ.
Robustness Check 3: Between Treatments Comparison of Updating Parameters
This section tests whether the belief updating parameters in our core specification are significantly
different between the three treatment groups. This is done by pooling together the three treatment
groups and estimating Equation 2, but with the inclusion of treatment dummies interacted with
the updating coefficients. This provides us with a test of whether the parameters differ between
either of the two asymmetric treatments and symmetric.
More specifically, this involves estimating the following equation:
4
p˜ii,j,t+1 =δp˜ii,j,t + γaq˜ · 1(si,j,t+1 = a)− γbq˜ · 1(si,j,t+1 = b)+
3∑
k=2
[δkp˜ii,j,t · T ki,j,t + γka q˜ · 1(si,j,t+1 = a) · T ki,j,t − γkb q˜ · 1(si,j,t+1 = b) · T ki,j,t] + i,j,t+1
where T ki,j,t is an indicator variable for treatment k [i.e. T ki,j,t = 1(Ti,j,t = k)], with Ti,j,t a treatment
variable taking the values {1, 2, 3} corresponding to the three treatment groups. The coefficients
δ,γa, and γb reflect the baseline parameters without the influence of state-contingent stakes and
the parametersδk, γka and γkb estimate the movement from these parameters for each of the two
state-contingent stake treatments, k ∈ {2, 3}.
The results from this exercise are presented in Table 6. The results show that, for the average in-
dividual, there are no systematic differences in the updating parameters across treatment groups.
This implies that the differences in exogenous state-contingent incentives do not exert a strong
influence on how individuals update their beliefs in the different treatments.
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Table 6: Testing for Differences in Average Updating Behavior between Treatment Groups.
Belief 1 Belief 2 Belief 3 Belief 4 Belief 5 Pooled Full Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Priors
δ 0.93 0.89 1.03 1.00 1.02 0.99 1.00
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03)
δ * T2 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.00 -0.04
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.04) (0.03)
δ * T3 0.02 0.06 -0.10 0.08 -0.04 0.00 -0.00
(0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.09) (0.04) (0.03)
Signal: Blue (s = a)
γa 0.81 1.02 1.03 1.30 1.28 1.09 0.84
(0.14) (0.18) (0.18) (0.21) (0.21) (0.11) (0.09)
γa * T2 0.09 -0.07 -0.15 -0.08 -0.16 -0.07 -0.01
(0.22) (0.26) (0.22) (0.34) (0.29) (0.15) (0.13)
γa * T3 0.12 -0.05 -0.10 0.07 0.21 0.05 0.04
(0.21) (0.22) (0.20) (0.28) (0.31) (0.15) (0.13)
Signal: Red (s = b)
γb 0.69 0.79 1.18 1.40 1.80 1.16 0.78
(0.11) (0.16) (0.19) (0.21) (0.23) (0.11) (0.09)
γb * T2 0.21 0.06 -0.33 -0.21 0.14 -0.04 0.11
(0.20) (0.22) (0.25) (0.27) (0.40) (0.17) (0.15)
γb * T3 0.30 0.04 -0.15 -0.37 -0.06 -0.05 0.10
(0.18) (0.20) (0.21) (0.25) (0.33) (0.15) (0.12)
Observations 700 700 700 700 700 3,500 5,550
Kleibergen-Paap F 46.61 47.46 56.63 60.45 64.03 93.17 53.88
(i) Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the individual level).
(ii) Estimates use the corrected beliefs and are instrumented using the correct lagged Bayesian posterior.
(iii) All of the non-interacted coefficients are significantly different from 0 at the 1% level. Only one of
the forty-two interaction coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 10% level. This is the γb
* T3 coefficient in the Belief 1 column, which is significant at the 10%, but not the 5% level.
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Appendix B.1: Core Properties of Bayes’ Rule
Möbius et al. (2014) argue that the core structure of Bayesian updating is captured by the fol-
lowing three properties:
1. invariance, whereby the difference in logit beliefs between t and t+ 1 depends only on the
history of signals, Ht+1, and the initial prior, p0 (i.e. on the agent’s information set). An
updating process is invariant if we can find a function gt such that:
logit(pit+1)− logit(pit) = gt(st+1, st, ..., s1; p0)
If an individual displayed base rate neglect or confirmatory bias, this would constitute a
violation of invariance (i.e. in the context of the model outlined in the main text, this
assumption stipulates that δ = 1).
2. pit is a sufficient statistic for all information received at time t or earlier, such that the change
in logit beliefs depends only on the new information in time t+ 1: logit(pit+1)− logit(pit) =
gt(st+1)
3. stability of the updating process over time. This property is satisfied if gt = g for all t.
Under the assumption that these properties are satisfied, the authors note that the class of updat-
ing processes that remain can be fully described by the two parameter function, g(st), where:
g(st) = log(
q
1− q ) · 1(st+1 = a)− log(
q
1− q ) · 1(st+1 = b)
This serves to motivate the model described in Equation 1.
Appendix B.2.1: The QSR and a Non-EU ‘Truth Serum’
In this section, we discuss how beliefs reported under the QSR might be distorted, and how we
address this challenge. Consider the binary event, denoted by Eω, where ω ∈ {A,B}. Therefore,
EA refers to the event that state ω = A is realized. The object that we would like to elicit is
the participant’s belief, pit = P (EA) = P (ω = A), regarding the likelihood that state ω = A is
the correct state at time t. However, the object that we will observe is the participant’s reported
belief, rt, at each point in time under the incentives prescribed by the quadratic scoring rule. The
Quadratic Scoring Rule at time t is defined by:
7
SA(rt) = 1− (1− rt)2 (6)
SB(rt) = 1− r2t (7)
where rt is the reported probability of eventEA occurring; SA(rt) is the payment if the state ω = A
is realized; SB(rt) is the payment if the state ω = B is realized. Therefore, the QSR essentially
involves a single choice from a list of binary prospects, (1 − (1 − rt)2)EA(1 − r2t ). The QSR is a
‘proper’ scoring rule since, if the agent is a risk neutral EU maximizer then she is incentivized to
truthfully reveal her belief, pit:
pit = arg max
rt[0,1]
pitSA(rt) + (1− pit)SB(rt)
However, the QSR is no longer incentive compatible once we allow for (i) risk aversion / loving
and (ii) participants who have exogenous stakes in the state of the world. The reasons for this
are the following. Firstly, it has been well documented theoretically that, if the participant is risk
averse, then the QSR leads to reporting of beliefs, rt, that are distorted towards 0.5, away from
her true belief, pit, when the participant has no exogenous stakes in the realized state.22 This
distortion has been observed in experimental data (Offerman et al., 2009; Armantier and Treich,
2013). Secondly, in our experiment, we are also interested in eliciting beliefs when participants
have an exogenous stake associated with one of the two states. More precisely, we are interested
in recovering the participant’s true belief when she receives an exogenous payment, x, if state
ω = A is realized. This payment, x, is in addition to the payment she receives from the QSR. In
other words, she chooses from a menu of binary prospects of the form: (x+1−(1−rt)2)EA(1−r2t ).
In the context of state-dependant stakes, a risk averse EU maximizer23 faces two distortionary
motives in reporting her belief: (i) she faces the motive to distort her belief towards 0.5 as dis-
cussed above; and (ii) in addition, there is a hedging motive, which will compel a risk averse
individual to lower her reported belief, rt, towards zero as x increases.
If the participants in our experiment are risk neutral expected utility maximizers, the reported be-
liefs, rt, that we elicit under the QSR will coincide with their true beliefs, pit. However, in order to
allow for choice behaviors consistent with a wider range of decision models, we measure the size
of the distortionary influence of the elicitation incentives at an individual level and correct the
22i.e. if pit > 0.5 then pit > rt > 0.5, and if pit < 0.5 then pit < rt < 0.5 for a risk averse individual reporting her
beliefs under QSR incentives.
23A participant who is a risk averse EU maximizer chooses her reported belief rt by solving the following maxi-
mization problem:
max
rt[0,1]
pitU(x+ 1− (1− rt)2) + (1− pit)U(1− r2t )
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beliefs accordingly. This approach is valid under the weak assumption that individuals evaluate
binary prospects according to the biseparable preferences24 model and are probabilistically sophis-
ticated.25 This restriction on behavior is very weak and includes individuals who behave according
to EU with any risk preferences as well as the majority of commonly used NEU models.26
A Non-EU ‘Truth Serum’
The discussion above has highlighted how beliefs might be distorted under QSR incentives. The
Offerman et al. (2009) approach proposes correcting the reported beliefs for the risk aversion
caused by the curvature of the utility function or by non-linear probability weighting. This ap-
proach involves eliciting participants’ reported belief parameter, r, for a set of risky events where
they know the objective probability, p (known probability). This is done under precisely the same
QSR incentive environment in which we elicit the participants’ subjective beliefs, pi, regarding the
events of interest (where they don’t know the objective probability: unknown probability). If a
subject’s reported beliefs, r, differ from the known objective probabilities, p, this indicates that
the subject is distorting her beliefs due to the incentive environment (e.g. due to risk aversion).
The objective of the correction mechanism is therefore to construct a map, R, from the objec-
tive beliefs, p ∈ [0, 1], to the reported beliefs, r, for each individual under the relevant incentive
environment.
Offerman et al. (2009) show that under the assumption that individuals evaluate prospects in
a way that is consistent with the weak assumptions of the biseparable preferences model, then in
the scenario where there are no state-contingent stakes (i.e. x = 0), individuals evaluate the
QSR menu of prospects (1 − (1 − rt)2)EA(1 − r2t ) according to w(P (EA))U(1 − (1 − rt)2) + (1 −
w(P (EA)))U(1− r2t ) for rt ≥ 0.5 and therefore the inverse of the map from objective probabilities
24The biseparable preference model holds if the preference ordering, %, over prospects of the form, yEz, can be
represented by:
yEz →W (E)U(y) + (1−W (E))U(z)
where U is a real-valued function unique up to level and unit; and W is a unique weighting function, satisfying
W (∅) = 0, W (S) = 1 and W (E) ≤ W (F ) if E ⊆ F . S is the set of all states and events are subsets of the full set
of states: i.e. E,F ⊆ S. In this paper, we only consider two-state prospects, where the state-space is partitioned
into two parts by an event, E and its complement Ec. Making the further assumption that the decision maker is
probabilistically sophisticated gives the following refinement:
yEz → w(P (E))U(y) + (1− w(P (E)))U(z)
25Probabilistic sophistication is the assumption that we can model that individual’s preferences over prospects as
if the individual’s beliefs over states can be summarized by a probability measure, P . In other words, probabilistic
sophistication implies that we can model the individual’s belief regarding the likelihood of an event E as being
completely summarized by a single probability judgment, P (EA).
26Amongst the models subsumed within the biseparable preferences model are EU, Choquet expected utility
(Schmeidler, 1989), maxmin expected utility (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989), prospect theory (Tversky and Kahne-
man, 1992), and α-maxmin expected utility (Ghirardato et al., 2004). See Offerman et al. (2009) for a discussion.
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to reported probabilities, R, is given by:
p = R−1(r) = w−1
 r
r + (1− r)U ′(1−(1−r)2)
U ′(1−r2)
 (8)
In the next section, we provide a derivation for this equation, as well as augmenting the Offerman
et al. (2009) approach to allow for the scenario where there are state-contingent stakes (i.e.
x 6= 0). This extension to Offerman et al. (2009) represents a special case of the more general
treatment of correction methods for binary proper scoring rules considered by Kothiyal et al.
(2011). In our empirical analysis, we discuss how we use Equation 8 to recover the function, R,
for each individual and thereby recover their beliefs, pit, from their reported beliefs, rt.
Appendix B.2.2: Augmenting the Offerman et al. (2009) ‘Truth
Serum’ Approach to Include Stakes
The previous section discussed the central ideas motivating the Offerman et al. (2009) approach
for correcting for hedging in cases where there are no state-dependent stakes (i.e. x = 0). In
projects studying the asymmetric updating hypothesis, allowing for state-dependent stakes (i.e.
x 6= 0) is of fundamental importance. Therefore, in this section, we consider an extension to the
Offerman et al. (2009) approach to correcting for hedging. The extension we consider is tailored
specifically to our experimental setting, however it is a special case of the more general set of
correction techniques studied by Kothiyal et al. (2011).27
In the case where x 6= 0, the text above discussed how participants who face the quadratic scor-
ing rule incentives, along with the non-zero state-contingent bonus x, essentially face a choice
from a menu of lotteries denoted by (x + 1 − (1 − rt)2)EA(1 − r2t ). An individual who satisfies
the biseparable preferences model and is probabilistically sophisticated will evaluate this prospect
using the following Equations:28
For x ≥ 1 or rt ≥ 0.5 :
w(P (EA))U(x+ 1− (1− rt)2) + (1− w(P (EA)))U(1− r2t ) (9)
27Kothiyal et al. (2011) extend the basic idea used by techniques aiming to correct elicited beliefs for reporting
bias (e.g. hedging) to apply to the set of all binary proper scoring rules, and cover the full domain of beliefs. In
conjunction with Offerman et al. (2009), this paper therefore offers a useful set of tools for accessing subjects’ true
beliefs in situations where they may have reason to distort their reports.
28For expositional simplicity, we don’t consider x ∈ (0, 1). The discussion below is easily extended to these cases,
but they are irrelevant for the purposes of this paper. This case is slightly different due to the fact that the probability
weights on events or states may depend on their ordinal ranking according to preferences in this model.
10
and similarly,
For x = 0 & rt < 0.5 :
(1− w(P (EcA)))U(x+ 1− (1− r)2t ) + w(P (EcA))U(1− r2t ) (10)
The reason for the two separate conditions is due to the way in which many NEU models, sub-
sumed within biseparable preferences model, allow the probability weighting function, w(.), over
events to be influenced by the ordinal ranking over the associated outcomes, from best to worst.29
Since the case where x = 0 is discussed extensively in Offerman et al. (2009), we will focus on the
case where x ≥ 1 in the discussion that follows. This case only requires a very minor adjustment
to their discussion. The key results are the following (adjusted to include the influence of x):
Result 1: Under NEU with known probabilities, p, the optimal reported probability, r = Rx(p)
satisfies:
If x ≥ 1,then p = R−1x (rt) = w−1
 rt
rt + (1− rt)U ′(x+1−(1−rt)2)U ′(1−r2t )
 (11)
Result 2: Under NEU with unknown probabilities, the optimal reported probability, r, satisfies:
If x ≥ 1,then P (E) = w−1
 rt
rt + (1− rt)U ′(x+1−(1−r)
2
t )
U ′(1−r2t )
 (12)
This motivates the simple strategy for recovering the agent’s subjective beliefs from her reported
beliefs under the specific incentive environment that she faces. Since the RHS of (11) and (12)
agree, we have:
P (E) = R−1x (r) (13)
which implies that if we can recover the function R−1x then we can map the reported beliefs to the
participant’s subjective beliefs. Equation 11 shows that we can recover this R−1x function in the
same way here, with the bonus payment of x, as in the case where x = 0 considered in Offerman
et al. (2009). Essentially, we provide the participant with prospects over known probabilities, p,
and ask them for their belief regarding the likelihood that one state will be realized. In order to
ensure the incentives to distort one’s reported beliefs are kept constant, we do this exercise under
precisely the same incentive environment as in the main belief updating task. By eliciting these
29When x = 0 and rt < 0.5, then 1− r2t > 1− (1− rt)2 (i.e. in this case, EcA becomes the preferred event, rather
than EA, and therefore the probability weighting function is reversed).
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reported beliefs associated with known probabilities spanning the whole unit interval, we can
use these (p, rt) pairs to estimate Rx(p) for each individual for the relevant incentive environment
created by the belief elicitation. Having estimated Rx(p), we can calculate its inverse, R−1x (r).
We can take any beliefs reported by the participant under the same belief elicitation incentives
and then use this estimated R−1x (r) to recover her true beliefs. In particular, we can use this
estimated function to recover her true beliefs from her reported beliefs in the belief updating task
that is the focus of this paper. Essentially, we are using this procedure to remove any misreporting
effect that the belief elicitation incentive environment may have. It allows us to correct for the
possibility that individuals may hold some belief P (E) or pi, but instead report a different belief,
r.
If the incentive environment does not cause the participant to report a belief different from her
true belief, then this procedure is unnecessary, but applying the procedure to her reported beliefs
will not have any effect. In this case, the corrected beliefs will be the same as the reported beliefs.
Appendix B.2.3: Calibration of the Belief Correction Procedure:
Theory
It is clear from the discussion in the main text and Equation 8, that we could recover R(.) non-
parametrically for each individual if we were to collect a large number of (p, r) pairs from partic-
ipants, such that the interval between the known probabilities, p, is sufficiently small. However,
since it is not practical here to elicit such a large number of observations from each participant,
we instead impose a parametric structure similar to the one used by Offerman et al. (2009).
For the utility function, U(.), we use the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) functional form:
U(x) =

xρ if ρ > 0
ln x if ρ = 0
−xρ if ρ < 0
(14)
For the probability weighting function, w(.), we adopt Prelec’s (1998), one-parameter family:30
30This is a special case of Prelec’s two-parameter family of weighting functions:
w(p) = exp[−β(− ln(p))α]
For the purposes of the current context, the two-parameter family is not practically suitable due to the limited
data we use at the individual level. This functional form permits the standard inverse-S shaped probability weighting
function that has been found to be consistent with the majority of the existing empirical evidence. When β = 1 in the
one-parameter family, the α parameter captures the degree of curvature of the inverse-S shape but the point at which
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w(p) = exp[−(− ln(p))α] (15)
Substituting these parametric functional form specifications into Equation 8 for the case where
x = 0 gives:
p = R−1(rt) = exp
− [− ln( rt(2rt − r2t )1−ρ
rt(2rt − r2t )1−ρ + (1− rt)(1− r2t )1−ρ
)] 1
α
 (16)
For the the case where x 6= 0, substituting these parametric functional form specifications de-
scribed in Equations 14 and 15 into Equation 11 gives:
p = R−1x (rt) = exp
− [− ln( rt(1− (1− rt)2 + x)1−ρ
rt(1− (1− rt)2 + x)1−ρ + (1− rt)(1− r2t )1−ρ
)] 1
α
 (17)
We therefore use this adapted specification for our correction mechanism for the combined and
separate treatment groups.
In our core analysis, for our individual level reported belief corrections, we will make the simpli-
fying assumption that α = 1, such that risk aversion is captured only through the curvature of
the utility function and not through the probability weighting function. The results are similar
when we use Prelec’s one parameter weighting function. Furthermore, it is substantially easier
to interpret the risk aversion parameter estimates when we estimate ρ alone, due to the strong
relationship between the ρ and α estimates .
We therefore estimate the following model, for each participant, in order to acquire a numerical
estimate for the inverse of this function, R(.):
logit[R(j/20)] = logit[h(j/20, α, ρ)] + uj (18)
where R(j/20) is the probability reported by the individual that corresponds to true known prob-
ability, p = j20 where 1 ≤ j ≤ 19.31 As discussed above, α is the parameter of the probability
weighting function; ρ gives the curvature of the utility function. The function h(.) is the inverse
of R−1. We estimate this function, h(.) numerically at each step32 within the maximum likelihood
estimation. The error terms, uj, are independently and identically distributed across participants
and choices and are drawn from a normal distribution. Essentially, here we are using each partic-
ipant’s 20 (r, p) pairs in order to estimate an R function that reflects the distortion in her reported
w(p) intersects the 45 degree line is predetermined. Adding the second parameter, β, extends the one-parameter
specification by allowing this fixed point to vary.
31In other words, for known probabilities, p, between 0.05 and 0.95 at intervals of 0.05.
32i.e. given the current parameter guesses.
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beliefs due to the particular quadratic scoring rule incentive structure that she is subject to. No-
tice, that this structure varies across treatments as x varies and therefore the same subject would
require a different adjustment curve if she were reassigned to a different treatment.
Using these estimates at an individual level allows us to recover the participants’ true subjective
beliefs, pit, from the first stage of the experiment in which they report their beliefs, rt, regarding
the likelihood of ω = A being the true state. In Figure 6, we graph the individual level correction
curve estimates for two individuals in each treatment group. It is clear from these examples,
firstly, that individuals in the sample are distorting their reported beliefs substantially relative to
the known probabilities, and secondly, that the estimated correction curves are sufficiently flexible
to fit different types of belief distortion behavior reasonably well. Furthermore, importantly, the
graph in the top-left panel of the figure shows that, when an individual accurately reports her
beliefs, then the correction mechanism has no harmful effect.
At the aggregate level, for each treatment group, T ∈ {1, 2, 3}, we estimate:
logit[Ri(j/20)] = logit[hi(j/20, α, ρ)] + ui,j (19)
where j indexes the 20 reported probabilities of individual i. This specification allows us to ex-
amine the distortion caused by the incentive environment to the average individual in each of the
three treatment groups.
Appendix B.2.4: Calibration of the Belief Correction Procedure:
Estimation
The belief correction procedure that we adopt involves assuming a flexible parametric form for
the participants’ utility and probability weighting functions in order to estimate the R function
discussed in Equation 8 above. We estimate this function for each individual separately in order
to correct the reported beliefs at the individual level. In addition, we estimate this function at
the aggregate level for each of the treatment groups in order to obtain a measure of the average
distortion of the incentive environment faced in each of the treatment groups. A detailed discus-
sion of the mechanics of the Belief Correction Procedure we use is provided in Appendix B.2.3
above. Essentially, we are simply fitting a curve through each subject’s belief elicitation incentive
distortion.
Figure 5 displays the average correction curves for each of the treatment groups, fitting a sin-
gle curve to the reported belief data observed across all subjects in the relevant treatment group.
Comparing the three subgraphs, we see that the average individual distorts the beliefs she reports
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in a way that is consistent with what risk aversion under EU would predict, with the inverse-S
shape distortion in the T1.Symmetric stakes treatment and the strong distortion downwards
(away from the more desirable state) in both of the Asymmetric stakes treatments. Further-
more, we see that the different ways of framing the same incentives in the two Asymmetric
treatments has a clear influence on behavior. In T2.Combined, the participants hedge far more
when choosing their reported beliefs in comparison to those in the T3.Separate group. This is
in spite of the fact that the incentives are identical in these two treatments. This indicates that
the reported beliefs in the T3.Separate treatment are closer to the participants’ true beliefs and
motivates this presentation of incentives as preferable for future work that calls for the elicitation
of beliefs when there are exogenous state-contingent payments.
At the individual level, there is a large degree of heterogeneity in the degree to which individuals
distorted their reported belief away from their actual belief, given the incentive environment. Fig-
ure 6 displays the correction curves estimated for two individuals from each treatment group. It is
clear from this figure that some individuals responded very strongly to the incentive environment
in which their belief was elicited, while others reported their belief more accurately. The belief
correction procedure is therefore very helpful for recovering the true beliefs of participants who
responded strongly to the incentive environment. In cases where the individual simply reported
their belief accurately, the corrected beliefs and the reported beliefs are exactly the same.
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Figure 5: Average Correction Functions across Treatments.
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Figure 6: Individual Level Estimates of the Incentive Correction Function.
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Appendix C: Endogeneity—An Illustrative Example
This section provides a simple illustrative example of why it is important to exercise caution in
addressing possible endogeneity issues when studying belief updating. When considering belief
updating in real world scenarios, we are often interested in studying how individuals update
their beliefs from home-grown prior beliefs (i.e. subjective prior beliefs that are not exogenously
endowed to subjects). However, when studying how subjects update beliefs from a home-grown
prior, it is important to pay careful attention to the possible endogenous relationships between:
(i) individual updating types, (ii) states of the world, and (iii) prior beliefs.33 In the illustrative
example I discuss below, I consider the implications of a relationship between (i) and (ii), allowing
for (iii) to be completely exogenous.
One domain where studying belief updating from home-grown priors is essential is the domain
of beliefs about the self. Beliefs about one’s self deserve special attention since they are of critical
importance in guiding our interaction with the world around us. This set of beliefs are also of
central importance to the literature considering the good-news, bad-news hypothesis, since these
beliefs are often heavy in affect, and are amongst the beliefs that we care most about.
However, when we study belief updating from subjective priors, there is a danger that an indi-
viduals prior beliefs are related to the way she updates her beliefs. Furthermore, if the beliefs
pertain to her self, her prior belief may be related to this fundamental, implying that the distri-
bution of signals she receives is related to this fundamental and to her prior. This is true even if
the individual receives “exogenous” noisy signals about the fundamental.
The following discussion has the objective of illustrating one possible way in which neglecting to
pay attention to the endogeneity of the signal distribution can be problematic. The example is
purely hypothetical, and rather contrived, but serves to illustrate the basic point. In particular, I
use a very simple “toy” simulation to demonstrate that ignoring this issue can (in principal) lead
to mistakenly find evidence for asymmetric updating when all individuals update symmetrically.
It is important to point out that I am not suggesting that this is the explanation for asymmetric
updating results observed in the literature34—I am simply highlighting a potential endogeneity
issue that should be addressed in this literature going forwards. In this regard, I also suggest a
simple solution for dealing with the issue.
Much of the belief updating literature considers situations that resemble the following basic struc-
ture: consider an agent who updates about two states of theworld, ω ∈ {High, Low}, and receives
a sequence of noisy signals, st ∈ {UP,DOWN}. This also reflects the setup considered in the
33In some cases, e.g. when forming beliefs about the self, there are differences across individuals in the fundamen-
tal (ii) that they are forming beliefs about. In these cases, the relationship between (i) and (iii) might be mediated
by a natural relationship between the fundamental (ii) and the priors.
34For example, Figure 3 in Möbius et al. (2014) suggests that this is probably not a major concern for their main
results. However, it is still important to control for this potential endogeneity issue as a robustness check.
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current paper. However, since it is very important to also understand how we form beliefs about
the self, in some studies the states are determined by personal characteristics of the individual
(e.g. IQ). This means that states are essentially equivalent to personal types (i.e. states = types).
The implication of this is that if signals are informative about the state of the world, then High
types are more likely than Low types to receive Up signals (and vice versa for Down signals). If
High types update their beliefs differently from Low types, this can (in principal) lead to finding
(what looks like) evidence that the average individual updates asymmetrically when no individual
actually does.
In order to show this, I conduct a very simple simulation exercise. I construct a population of 10
000 individuals who are randomly assigned to one of two types, ω ∈ {High, Low}. Within each
type, the agents’ prior beliefs about the likelihood of being the High type are assigned randomly
using a uniform distribution, distributed between zero and one.35 High types receive an Up signal
with probability q = 58 and Low types receive a Down signal with probability q = 58 . Using a seed
of 1000 in STATA, the observed empirical distribution of signals across types is shown in Figure
7.
Figure 7: Frequencies of Signals by Type
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Now, the important part of this story is that belief updating may (in principal) be related to the
underlying fundamental of interest. For example, it is conceivable that high IQ individuals process
information and update their beliefs differently from low IQ individuals.36
35Note, this is an unrealistic assumption. In general, prior beliefs are related to the true state of the world. For
example, beliefs about one’s rank in an IQ distribution tend to be correlated with one’s actual rank. However, for the
purposes of this illustration, constructing type and prior belief to be orthogonal allows us to isolate only the effect
of the endogeneity of types and signals (with exogenous priors). Allowing for priors to be related to the underlying
fundamental would add an additional layer of endogeneity issues.
36Note, even if one doesn’t find the story that the two types (here, High and Low) might update their beliefs dif-
ferently compelling, a very similar pattern could also be generated if there is a relationship between prior beliefs and
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Here, we consider two types that use different, but always symmetric, updating rules. In particular,
we consider a High type that is perfectly Bayesian, and a Low type that is not very responsive to
new information (but otherwise very well behaved her belief updating).37
The High type updates according to the following rule (δ = 1, γUP = 1, γDOWN = 1):
logit(pit+1) = 1 · logit(pit) + 1 · log(53) · 1(st+1 = UP )− 1 · log(
5
3) · 1(st+1 = DOWN) (20)
The Low type updates according to the following rule (δ = 1, γUP = 0.2, γDOWN = 0.2):
logit(pit+1) = 1 · logit(pit) + (0.2) · log(53) · 1(st+1 = UP )− (0.2) · log(
5
3) · 1(st+1 = DOWN) (21)
However, if we as the analyst neglect the possibility that the two types update their beliefs dif-
ferently, then we might obtain biased parameters. This is illustrated by the regression estimates
presented in column 1 and 2 of Table 7 below. These columns reflect the estimates from the
standard specification used in this literature (i.e. equation 2). These parameter estimates, along
with the true population averages are summarised as follows:
True Parameter Values (Population Ave.) Estimates
δ 1 1
γUP 0.6 0.7
γDOWN 0.6 0.5
It is clear from this that in spite of the fact that there is not a single individual in this population
who updates asymmetrically that the estimated parameters suggest that there is an asymmetry.
Notice, the standard errors are small and the adjusted R2 suggests a good model fit (see Table
updating. This follows because: (i) prior beliefs about one’s self are typically related to the underlying fundamental
in question (e.g. beliefs about one’s IQ positively correlated with actual IQ), (ii) types are mechanically related to
the distribution of signals in the class of experiments we’re considering, and therefore (iii) prior beliefs are related
to the distribution of signals observed. Therefore, the story described in this section is worth paying attention to in
any situation where at least one of the following might be violated:
(1) states of the world ⊥ belief updating and (2) priors ⊥ belief updating
37Note, neither of the typesmakes any errors in their belief updating. They both follow their updating rule perfectly.
This exercise therefore rules out several other channels that can make life challenging for the analyst (e.g. errors
related to priors or types).
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7). As mentioned above, this is simply an illustration of why it is important to pay attention to
the relationship between the distribution of signals and the types. Furthermore, it is important to
point out that one can make an similar argument to show that even if the majority of individuals
in the population are asymmetric updaters that the neglect of a relationship between signals and
types could (in principal) generate estimates that suggest symmetric updating.
Fortunately, this particular endogeneity issue is easy to deal with by simply considering updating
behavior within each type (e.g. interacting the RHS variables of equation 2 with the Type dummy
variable). This is illustrated in column 3 of Table 7. Notice, also, that simply including the Type
dummy variable in the regression does not solve the problem (see column 2).
Table 7: Estimates of Simulated Data Parameters
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
(1) (2) (3)
δ 1.002 1.002 1.000
(0.001) (0.001) (.)
γUP 0.696 0.683 0.200
(0.005) (0.007) (.)
γDOWN 0.504 0.513 0.200
(0.006) (0.006) (.)
High Type (=1) 0.0114
(0.004)
High Type (=1) * δ 0.000
(.)
High Type (=1) * γUP 0.800
(.)
High Type (=1) * γDOWN 0.800
(.)
N 10000 10000 10000
Adjusted R2 0.99 0.99 1.00
(i) Standard errors in parentheses
(ii) Note: Std errors in column 3 missing due to perfect fit.
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Appendix D: Supplementary Figures, Results and Experimental
Instructions
Figure 8: Comparison of Initial (Period 0) Belief with the Exogenous Prior
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Table 8: First Stage Regressions Output Associated with Table 3
T1: SYMMETRIC T2: COMBINED T3: SEPARATE
Reported Corrected Reported Corrected Reported Corrected
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b)
δIV 0.81 0.82 0.95 0.92 0.88 0.85
(0.06)*** (0.05)*** (0.06)*** (0.06)*** (0.06)*** (0.05)***
γa -0.07 -0.07 -0.60 -0.05 -0.03 -0.09
(0.11) (0.10) (0.22)*** (0.20) (0.25) (0.25)
γb -0.17 -0.20 0.34 -0.20 -0.24 -0.21
(0.10)* (0.11)* (0.20)* (0.17) (0.23) (0.26)
Kleibergen Paap F 170.39 228.03 238.80 256.15 220.64 276.53
Shea Partial R2 0.58 0.61 0.48 0.50 0.50 0.49
N 1,075 1,075 1,285 1,285 1,140 1,140
(i) Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the individual level).
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Table 10: Average Updating Behavior across Treatments (Full Sample)
T1: SYMMETRIC T2: COMBINED T3: SEPARATE
Reported Corrected Reported Corrected Reported Corrected
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b)
OLS
δ 0.74 0.73 0.80 0.80 0.84 0.86
(0.05)*** (0.06)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.04)*** (0.03)***
γa 0.95 0.92 0.86 0.91 1.00 0.93
(0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10)
γb 0.83 0.78 0.99 0.90 0.96 0.91
(0.10)* (0.10)** (0.14) (0.12) (0.10) (0.09)
p (H0 : γa = γb) 0.26 0.19 0.25 0.90 0.64 0.80
N 1,875 1,875 1,850 1,850 1,825 1,825
R2 0.52 0.51 0.62 0.64 0.67 0.70
IV
δ 0.99 1.00 0.96 0.95 0.99 1.00
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)** (0.02) (0.02)
γa 0.87 0.84 0.87 0.83 0.95 0.88
(0.09) (0.09)* (0.10) (0.09)* (0.11) (0.09)
γb 0.82 0.78 0.89 0.89 0.92 0.88
(0.09)* (0.09)** (0.12) (0.12) (0.09) (0.08)
p (H0 : γa = γb) 0.47 0.44 0.83 0.51 0.74 0.98
N 1,875 1,875 1,850 1,850 1,825 1,825
1st Stage F 70.89 82.63 82.83 82.45 54.72 59.90
(i) Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the individual level).
(ii) All coefficients are significantly different from 0 at the 1% level. Therefore, t-tests of the null
hypothesis (H0: Coefficient = 1) are reported: * = 10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%.
(iii) The rows corresponding to p (H0 : γa = γb) report the p-statistic from a t-test of the equality
of the coefficients γa and γb (i.e. a test of the asymmetric updating hypothesis).
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